

*Background Material  
for 25 October*

State Department review completed

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Final Draft

Scenario for Airstrike against offensive  
missile bases and bombers in Cuba.

ADVANTAGES

1. Carries out President's pledge to eliminate offensive threat to U.S. and Hemisphere from Cuba and avoids any erosion of U.S. momentum and position. The pledge carried out shows that U.S. has will to fight and to protect vital interests (of great importance vis-a-vis Berlin).
2. Since directed at offensive weapons, keeps issue focused on Soviet nuclear presence in Cuba in defiance of OAS and majority of Security Council.
3. Sharp, possible one time action, may carry smaller risks of further escalation than a series of confrontations over a period of time. Soviet decision to risk major war unlikely to be decisively affected by this action in an area non-vital to the Soviets.
4. Prompt action will avoid danger of a growth of hands-off Cuba movement throughout Latin America which might make it increasingly difficult to strike at offensive weapons. Present willingness of Latin Americans to support strong action probably cannot be maintained indefinitely.
5. Signals clearly that U.S. not prepared to bargain bases in Cuba for positions in Berlin, NATO and elsewhere.
6. It could demonstrate to Cubans, Castro and others, the weakness of Soviet position in Cuba. In the absence of a strong Soviet reaction in defense of Cuba, we would start the process of disenchantment and disaffection requisite to undermining Castro and Cuban reliance on the Soviet Union. We would also weaken any tendencies to rely on Soviets elsewhere in world.
7. Remove military threat to U.S. from Cuban territory.
8. Denial Khrushchev a possible cheap victory through successful maintenance of offensive weapons in Cuba.

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DISADVANTAGES

1. This action may force Khrushchev to react strongly and could result in some type of war. Khrushchev will not order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he is ready for war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks of major war are greater than through escalation of blockade.

2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.

3. Adverse effect on U. S. image of initiation of use of force against a small country. This can be minimized by making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive weapons. At same time there would be positive increments to our image from demonstration of clear willingness to take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.

4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range U.S.-Cuban relations.

5. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus calling for follow up attacks and/or invasion, unless full and unlimited international inspection is agreed to.

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PREREQUISITES FOR DECISION

1. Veto of U.S. resolution in Security Council.
2. Evidence that Soviets have continued build-up of existing offensive capability in Cuba in defiance of Presidential warning and OAS resolution.

ACTIONS PRIOR OR SIMULTANEOUS TO STRIKE

1. White House statement that offensive build-up is continuing, a dangerous and provocative act, which increases gravity of situation. Repeats warning for those engaged in this work.
2. Delivery of copy of White House statement to Cuban representative at UN.
3. Evacuation warning (as long as militarily feasible) to personnel in strike areas by leaflet drop. A strike plan designed to accomplish mission with minimum damage to non-military targets.
4. Inform OAS (Chairman) shortly in advance of strike.
5. Arrange for Ambassadors to notify Latin American heads of state at zero hour.
6. Inform NATO Allies and others at appropriate time.
7. Letter to K delivered at zero hour, describing action and indicating regret that continuation of work at offensive sites had forced action, limited nature of operation, our effort to limit personnel losses, and calling for immediate consultations to reduce world-wide tensions.

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**FOLLOW UP ACTIONS**

1. Continuation of close air surveillance.
2. Be prepared to hit SAM sites and airfields if reconnaissance planes attacked.
3. Immediate report to Organ of Consultation (OAS) and adoption of resolution requesting Soviets to evacuate offensive forces from Cuba under international inspection.
4. Report to UN Security Council explaining limited nature of operation and requesting immediate despatch of UN observer team to Cuba.
5. Maintenance of blockade extended to include POL until clear evidence is available that offensive bases have been eliminated.
6. Major Presidential address including special message to Cuban people.
7. Appropriate leaflet drops over Cuba.

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October 25, 1962

POLITICAL PATH

This path has several branches, both as to the forum in which negotiations are carried out, and with regard to the steps to be taken.

With respect to the forum, we are already in the UN and this could be combined with private approaches on the side. We could follow up the U Thant proposals in order to get into prompt discussion with the Soviets. This is almost essential since the Soviets will almost certainly not put forward or indicate agreement to proposals publicly made.

Another method would be to propose or have someone such as U Thant propose a direct meeting with Khrushchev. He has publicly indicated his readiness for such a meeting in his letter to Bertrand Russell and could not have been expected, at this stage, to have made proposals directly to the President for fear of a rebuff. It would be difficult, however, for him to refuse an invitation from the President. A direct meeting would have to mean the continuance of the quarantine and would be difficult for us unless there was progress on proposals to ensure a standstill under UN control. It would probably involve discussions over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile base in Turkey. A prompt proposal for an agreement to a meeting

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with Khrushchev might defer or avoid strong Soviet reaction to our stopping one of their ships.

As a background for political action that would have any hope of success, it would be important to minimize, so far as possible, any forceful action against Soviet vessels in carrying out the quarantine.

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The following political actions might be considered:

1. A proposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory contiguous or in proximity of the territory of the other.
2. An alternative approach might be to have a proposal for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take control over the missiles there pending the outcome of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing such proposals.

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3. Approach to Castro

An approach would be made to Castro through a Latin American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian Ambassador, pointing out that Cuba was merely being exploited in the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction. It could be pointed out that President Kennedy has stated that only two subjects were not negotiable between the United States and Castro: military ties to the USSR and aggressive actions of any kind in Latin America.

If the Castro Government considers it has no freedom to act because of the presence of Soviet technicians, we would be prepared to undertake to deal with this problem. We would have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves undertake to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so.

CONFIDENTIAL

DENUCLEARIZATION TRACK

1. It may take as much as 24 hours to persuade the Brazilian Government to sponsor our resolution in place of theirs in the Organ of Consultation and the United Nations. A telegram to Ambassador Gordon and conversations with the two Brazilian Ambassadors here would initiate action.

2. With Brazilian sponsorship it should be possible in 24 hours to secure action close to unanimity by the Organ of Consultation on the resolution. Telegrams to our Ambassadors in each of the Organ of Consultation countries, as well as Ambassadors here, would be utilized to secure support.

3. Immediately the Organ of Consultation has acted the Brazilians should submit a similar proposal to the United Nations for approval.

There is attached a draft resolution which we would ask the Brazilians to sponsor.

It is possible that the above 48 hour schedule could be cut, and, if approval is given tonight, the Organ of Consultation might act Saturday morning.

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WHEREAS:

The Council of the Organization of American States Acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation in its Resolution of October 23, 1962, recognizing that "Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, has secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads" called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability; the e

The establishment of nuclear missile capability on the territory of an American Republic which did not possess such capability at the date on which the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance came into effect creates a situation which would endanger the peace and security of the continent and is thus inconsistent with the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the OAS;

THE COAS/OC

1. Decides that no American Republic referred to in the preceding paragraph shall establish or permit the establishment within its territory of nuclear missiles or missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

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DRAFT TELEGRAM

This document consists of 3 pages  
Copy # 18 of 30 copies Series A.

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ACTION: USUN, New York

Re: New York's 1456.

Believe Brazilian proposal offers possibilities helpful to current Cuban situation. It appears to Department that of various alternatives open for disposal problem created by build-up Soviet offensive on Cuba, this perhaps most attractive and feasible for following reasons:

(a) Assuming Communists will be willing abandon use of Cuba as nuclear base in face our pressures without requiring our withdrawal from us, which is our present negotiating position, proposal for LA demilitarized zone would offer attractive face-saving way out for Communist side, this particularly true since present proposal is bona fide LA initiative and Cuba could accept on grounds they deferring to wishes of LA not desire to make entire area nuclear free zone to which they wish contribute as gesture desire to return to more normal situation in area (Latin American espoused in HAR-Ghana draft resolution). Since such arrangement would constitute voluntary Cuban association with LA initiative, Cuban could play positive response as completely divorced from US pressure. Moreover, USSR itself in this way could be removed one step from process and would not be required abandon Cuba as missile base except in terms of response to requests from Cuban Government.

(b) This approach avoids need for us to enter direct negotiations with the Communists in which we would confront them with categorical demands for

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dismantling missile installations in Cuba.

(c) Such outcome has chance of being widely regarded in world opinion as positive development (to which our action on Cuba would clearly have contributed) in an aspect of disarmament which is extremely attractive to large part of world. Such outcome would appear positive and constructive solution, not only in eyes foreign public opinion, but should be seen domestically as acceptable outcome of Cuban crisis since our fundamental objective would have been achieved.

(d) Denuclearization arrangements in Africa and Latin America consistent with long-term national security interests of US. FYI. We see some tactical advantage in treating questions African and LA zones together for time being, since enthusiasm for one will assist in building support for other. However, for US, acceptability of one would not need be dependent upon both being put into effect. END FYI.

US Del should be guided by following points in any discussions with Brazilians re resolution contained refel:

1. US would in principle favor denuclearized arrangements both in Africa and Latin America if such arrangements worked out and agreed to by the states in those areas. We believe, as Brazilians do, that arrangements should include adequate verification to assure all states in area of compliance. FYI. The US, of course, assumes and desires that other Latin American countries would agree to form such a zone only if effective Cuban participation were assured. END FYI.

2. US believes any arrangements for denuclearized zones should be

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determined by the countries of the region. We would therefore not support action by Security Council or GA which appeared to impose such arrangements or to dictate their character. US hopes Brazilians would agree with this concept and consider alterations in their draft. Resolution contained reftel places SC in position of calling upon member states to effect to treat continents as demuclearized in absence agreement on part states concerned rather than to cooperate with arrangements reached. Furthermore, it places SC in position of imposing committee to deal with suggestion on states concerned.

3. US would be prepared to declare its willingness to cooperate with arrangements worked out by all the states in the areas concerned.

We do not believe we should get into any detailed discussions in precise language of Brazilian text. However, US Del might say that we would vote in favor of any resolution consistent with above points. We would be prepared to vote for resolution which endorsed establishment committee agreed by states concerned, and we would also be prepared to support call upon SYG to lend his good offices on request of states concerned.

You should also indicate we would like move ahead rapidly on this front. At same time, we have several major problems with language in present text and hope Brazil will rework draft quickly to meet basic points described above and discuss with us again soonest.

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The Possible Role of a Progressive Economic Blockade  
Against Cuba

1. The Cuban economy is in progressive decline, stemming from an inability to maintain its level of exports; the inadequate substitution of bloc credits and trade for this export decline; gross mismanagement of both agriculture and industry (except petroleum and nickel refining); and a deterioration of industrial plant due to the problem of replacing Free World spare parts. The situation has been exacerbated by mobilization; to a degree, it will be worsened by the limited blockade which now operates, since the vessels which have turned back almost certainly contain economic as well as military materials; and (quite substantially) because of other blockade-induced disturbances to normal trade.

2. The Cuban economy is extraordinarily dependent on foreign trade. Cuban imports constituted about 36% of GNP pre-Castro 31% now. Cuba's dependence on major categories of specific imports follows:

100% (or virtually 100%)	POL Transportation equipment Wheat & flour Lard Finished metals (iron, steel, copper)
More than 50%	Raw materials for textiles Drugs and medicines Machinery & other manufactures Raw materials for fertilizers Rice Industrial chemicals
25-50%	Canned & packaged foods Beans
virtually 0	Tropical foodstuffs Ramon & rayon cord

3. Cuba's

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3. Cuba's greatest vulnerability to blockade is POL, on which the operation of its industry, its military establishment, and its civil services depend. Stocks now are estimated at 120 days for heavy fuels, 60 days for light fuels. A POL blockade would, in effect, bring the economy to a halt and radically limit military capabilities. A cutoff would immediately force rationing measures, which, if stringent, might stretch the existing stock out to six months but with grave consequences for the economy and for public morale. Moreover, the regime and the populace would be faced with the prospect of total economic collapse at the end of six months. A signal of US determination to proceed with a POL blockade would be immediately understood in both Havana and Moscow as a decisive act which, however, would grant them time to reconsider their present policy as well as to consider countermeasures.

4. Politically and psychologically a POL (or more general) blockade, if maintained against countermeasures, would set in motion (or reinforce) a growing feeling of isolation in Cuba, dramatizing the Soviet unwillingness or inability to aid Cuba in a major crisis. It could lead to major changes in the policy of the Cuban Government, to widespread unrest (both elite and popular), or to both.

5. For Moscow a progressive blockade would signal: (a) our seriousness of intent; (b) specifically, our unwillingness to bargain for the withdrawal of their missile installations against any Free World asset except the blockade itself; (c) our willingness to afford time for a face-saving resolution of the missile problem.

6. For the US and the Free World a progressive blockade would signal: (a) our seriousness of intent, despite external pressures for a quick, ambiguous negotiation; (b) our determination not to ease pressure until the Cuban missile issue is definitively settled; (c) that time - but not much time - existed in which to find a diplomatic resolution of the problem; and (d) that, in accordance with the President's address, further measures were

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in prospect if Havana and Moscow did not find a way to remove the offensive installations.

7. Thus, a persuasive signal of movement towards a progressive economic blockade could play a role with respect to either the Dillon or the Thompson track; that is, it could constitute a build-up of pressure leading, if it were judged necessary, to a direct removal of the missile threat to Cuba; or it could constitute a persuasive background to a discreet approach to Castro to disassociate himself from the Soviets or to the emergence of the Brazilian formula for an atom-free Latin America, as the way out.

8. With respect to Moscow, two critical problems of communication are involved: the problem of signaling well in advance changes in our blockade list to afford ample time for instructions to turn around; the problem of signaling lucidly both the imperatives of our position and its limits. The launching of a progressive economic blockade should be read in Moscow not as a commitment to throttle the Cuban Government, but as evidence of our willingness to permit them time for a graceful exit. On the other hand, it is essential to impart a sense of our determination to see the end of the missile threat in Cuba promptly, by one means or another, and without bargaining against other Free World interests. This latter problem of communication might well justify reliable discreet contact with Soviet officials at the time this track was launched.

9. With respect to the Free World we will, evidently confront serious resistance, notably if a progressive economic blockade is read as an effort to throttle Cuba. A blockade limited to POL, leaving food and medicine to go through, would ease this problem to some extent, although it would require a particular and carefully designed rationale to relate our acts to the offensive missile threat. The most important counterweight to the strains within the Free World this initiative might impose would be the appearance, at least, of active diplomatic contact and negotiation while the POL blockade tightened.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*



THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

25 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

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25 October 1962

# I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA

No change has been noted in the pace of construction activities at the identified MRBM and IRBM sites. The estimated dates of operational readiness for these sites remain as previously reported. (Two MRBM sites are believed already operational, three others will probably become operational today, and the sixth on 28 October. Of the three IRBM sites, one may become operational by 1 December, and the other two by 15 December.)

Photography [ ] revealed no new missile sites, and no additional missiles, missile transporters or erectors at already identified sites.

There is increasing evidence of camouflage at several sites. [ ]

Among the Soviet ships formerly en route to Cuba which have reversed their course are three with hatches capable of handling ballistic missiles.

There is still no positive evidence that nuclear weapons are deployed in Cuba. If nuclear warheads are not there now, the USSR could deliver them by submarine or, more feasibly, by aircraft. A TU-114 could fly non-stop to Cuba with up to ten nuclear warheads, following a greatcircle route which would not pass over any other country.

A recent [ ] report indicates that Soviet construction equipment and material for the suspected nuclear storage building at the Remedios IRBM site had arrived in Remedios as early as 29 September.

All of the 24 identified surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in Cuba now are operational. [ ]

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
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Free World press representatives in Cuba

report the city to be calm and the atmosphere relatively normal. Reports reflect none of the confusion and disorganization that accompanied the general mobilization just prior to the April 1961 invasion.

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Commentaries after the 23 October speech by Fidel Castro have followed the line he established. He denied that any offensive weapons are in Cuba and did not once use the word missiles.

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25 October 1962

## II. SOVIET SHIPPING TO CUBA

Information [redacted] that at least 14 of the 22 Soviet dry cargo ships and tankers which were en route to Cuba on 23 October have altered course and are now returning to Soviet ports. Although all the Soviet vessels may eventually turn back, the five tankers and three of the dry cargo ships appear to be continuing toward Cuba.

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
There is no indication at this time of any grouping of ships to form a convoy.

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The tanker nearest Cuba--the BUCHAREST--appeared to stop shortly before entering the US quarantine zone, but now is proceeding toward Cuba.


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Two of the dry cargo ships which have turned back were nearing waters north of Puerto Rico when they changed course but they now are back in mid-Atlantic.

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The ships turned around well before President Kennedy signed the proclamation establishing a quarantine zone around Cuba. Thus far no Soviet ships have entered the zone since it was established. Only two Soviet ships--one a tanker--have arrived in Cuba since 23 October and both of these were well within the zone prior to its establishment.

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B. Bloc Statements of Position

Khrushchev's 24 October statement that he would consider a "top-level meeting useful" is front paged by Soviet newspapers and has been carried on both Moscow domestic broadcasts and TASS. At least one Soviet commentary beamed to North America has quoted from the Soviet Premier's message to Bertrand Russel in urging the US to be reasonable on the Cuban issue. Except for these references, however, there has been no further Moscow emphasis on the urgency of a heads of government meeting. There has been no mention by Soviet communication media of the diversion of Soviet shipping from the US quarantine zone.

Moscow continues to skirt the issue of specific retaliatory action against the US. Yesterday's Izvestiya maintained the Soviet charge that the US is obsessed with the idea of some "mythical threat from Cuba."

Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky today reiterated the USSR's position that the Soviet armed forces now are in a state of "highest battle readiness," and declared that at the "first signal all the might of all our armed forces must be brought into immediate action against the enemy."

In the first public treatment of the Sino-Indian border clashes, the USSR, in endorsing Peiping's proposals to resolve the dispute, contrasted the Bloc's willingness to negotiate such problems with the "aggressive actions of the US aimed at Cuba and the whole world." Soviet commentary to its home audience continually refers to the "false allegations" of the US concerning Soviet offensive rockets. These broadcasts are again citing the 11 September Soviet contention that the USSR has no need for missile sites outside its own territory.

Reports from Soviet officials provide no firm evidence as to future Soviet intentions. A Czech official in Vienna has reportedly taken the line that there will be lengthy discussion at the UN. The Polish ambassador to Austria dismissed as "ridiculous" a suggestion that the situation might lead to war. On 24 October a Soviet diplomat in Washington stated that Soviet ships had been ordered to proceed to Cuba.

East European satellites are continuing their warnings against any direct US intervention in Cuba. Hungary

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and Rumania now have issued statements in full support of the 23 October Soviet statement and have urged effective UN action to dissuade the US from its "warlike action." Tito has also called for UN intervention. Poland charged that US aggression was being planned at the very time negotiations on "most urgent international problems" were already in progress. Albania, in its first monitored commentary on the situation, has charged the US with "preparing another aggression against Cuba" but failed to mention the formal Soviet statement. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in an impromptu speech yesterday in East Berlin, omitted any reference to the Cuban situation. His remarks on the German situation--the first direct commentary by a high Soviet official on this issue since the President's address on Cuba--contained no hint of retaliatory measure against the Western position in Berlin. While he reiterated standard Soviet themes on the necessity for the Western powers to withdraw their "occupation troops" from Berlin, he repeated his conviction that an agreement is possible.

Communist China's first official reaction to the crisis was contained in a government statement of 25 October expressing "great indignation" at the "serious war provocation" of the US. Peiping declared it would wage a "resolute struggle" against the US action, but gave no indication that it is planning any specific countermoves. The Chinese referred briefly to the 23 October Soviet statement on Cuba, and expressed full support for Moscow.

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#### IV. Non-Bloc Reaction

There is no observable reaction as of 0600 EDT to the diversion of most Soviet shipping from courses for Cuba, apparently because the fact has not yet become known. As a result, the UN remains the principal arena for developments.

Neutral nation representatives in New York continued their search yesterday for means of lowering tension, and after consulting their governments overnight, are planning to meet again at about 0830 or 0900.

A joint UAR-Ghana resolution requesting the principal to refrain from actions which might aggravate the situation failed to win widespread support. During the late afternoon, following a USUN briefing of African nations, the Malayan ambassador stated he saw a significant change toward greater "realism" in African attitudes. He reported this would be reflected in a new draft of the UAR-Ghana resolution now being prepared. The UN Security Council debate was limited to several expressions of support for the United States and a Romanian statement supporting the Soviet resolution condemning the United States.

During the evening, U Thant addressed appeals to President Kennedy, Premier Khrushchev, and Cuban leaders. He requested suspension of the blockade, halting of arms shipments to Cuba, and a peaceful attitude on the part of Cuba itself. President Kennedy's reply to U Thant sent in the early morning hours of 25 October, has as yet elicited no reaction.

Official and unofficial expressions of support, sympathy, or understanding for the US position on Cuba--either overtly or privately expressed by government leaders--have reached an impressive volume from all parts of the world. Nations from which such expressions have recently been received are Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg, Ireland, Syria, Iran, India, Thailand, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, Jamaica, and Panama. Among the very few nations or groups expressing open opposition to the US stand was the Algerian National Liberation Front, which termed the blockade of Cuba "an intolerable interference in the internal affairs of that country." An official Iraqi statement also says the US blockade is a "flagrant violation of the principle of freedom of the international seas" and a "regression for the organization of international society."

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In response to a US request that governments prevent landings or overflights of Soviet aircraft carrying military cargoes to Cuba, the Sudanese Foreign Minister said any Soviet request for military overflights or for transport flights carrying military equipment would be denied, as would any request for "commercial" flights beyond Khartoum. Libya indicated it would not grant overflights to Cuba either directly or via South America. The Moroccan Foreign Secretary confirmed that a proposed air agreement with the USSR had not yet been signed and that his government would "try to do something." The Foreign Minister of Senegal stated that, according to a cabinet decision, Dakar would be closed for military use by either side. The government of Jamaica will not grant regular landing or overflight rights to Soviet aircraft bound for Cuba.

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Prime Minister Diefenbaker, though publicly welcoming the US decision to take the Cuban issue to the UN Security Council, has refused to be pinned down by opposition spokesmen as to whether his government will give full support to US policy on Cuba.

The press generally supports US moves regarding Cuba but offers some criticism of the US for acting unilaterally and sees very serious dangers in the situation.

The British government has emphasized its support for the US position and ordered support in the United Nations, but public opinion remains somewhat skeptical and the press keeps up a critical tone. Gaitskell has privately told US officials he is concerned over Washington's unilateral action and personally doubts that the USSR has aggressive designs against the American mainland.

In Latin America, military support for the quarantine action has been offered by Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Enthusiastic backing for the US position is reported among the Chilean armed forces, particularly on the part of air force officers. The Argentine government has offered two destroyers on three days' notice, with a submarine, a marine battalion with transport, and other units if required later. The Argentine air

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force commander has sent messages to General LeMay and other hemisphere air force commanders pledging readiness to participate in any joint measures required by the Cuban crisis.

The Peruvian offer is qualified by a requirement of unanimous OAS approval. The Uruguayan government, according to press reports, has now decided to support the OAS resolution, but with certain reservations on the use of armed force.

President Duvalier of Haiti and President Rivera of El Salvador have announced support for the quarantine policy. President Goulart of Brazil, however, apparently seeks a mediatory role;

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[REDACTED] Demonstrations of opposition remain scattered and ineffective. The Communists appear reluctant to commit themselves to a major effort in the face of widespread official and public acceptance of the US position.

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